The value of the armed struggle

This is an important time to reaffirm the significance and the validity of the armed revolutionary struggle. The XIVth Congress proposed that the various forms of revolutionary violence respond to the reality in which our people live and struggle; to the sharpening of social contradictions; to the cruel political and economic offensive of imperialism and of the bourgeoisie; to the characteristics of state domination; to social and historical reasons, and in the conditions in which the struggle for power is posed. These forms have been generated from political struggle and from the struggles of the people. They are not alien or mere accessories to those. Nor are they the production of the subjective will of the left, but rather they are a consequence of reality. While such objective and subjective factors persist so the armed struggle and the guerrilla movement must continue their existence, and this expression of revolutionary violence maintains its significance and validity.
We must emphasise the enormous intervention of imperialism in Colombia as being at the root of the changes in the world situation since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Within this framework we must not underestimate the importance of the Andina strategy worked out by the Pentagon and the Southern Command which has the DEA as its main executive given the importance which the US attaches to it in the struggle against narcotics trade. In the present situation of the country what stands out is the profound crisis of the state which exhibits the following structural problems:
- A view of the state which promotes social disintegration and national disunity;
- The weakening of the legitimacy of state institutions due to the flagging of their social support and the failure of confidence generated by this;
- The extreme strengthening of the Executive, especially the President;
- The decline and lack of credibility of parliament, corroded by sleaze and scandals;
- The politicisation of the judiciary system which, on top of everything, has oriented itself towards war, thus exaggerating the contradictions between the State and its citizens;
- The conversion of exceptional measures into normal ones and the extension of the State of Emergency, that is to say the state of war, now in the name of internal unrest;
- The opposing of ruling casts by the making of changes, however minimal these may be, in favour of majorities economically, politically and socially;
- Rampant and defiant militarism which puts its plans and its ambitions above national interests;
- The strengthening of militarism and repression as a permanent line of action on the part of the State;
- The intensification of private and State violence which expresses itself in attacks on protests and social struggles, and in crimes, threats, and pressures against fighters for the people.
Certainly the profound crisis and the corruption of the State lie behind the grave problems which characterise the present situation. The State is ready to use force in order to guarantee super exploitation in favour of a privileged elite, in order to maintain unjust social relations and a closed political order, to protect the status quo at the cost of the blood and sweat of the Colombians who are forced to submit to the yoke of neoliberalism.
The State invests many resources in anti-popular warfare and in generalised repression, and every day it invests less in the people's needs as regards health, poverty, unemployment, hunger, and helplessness. This situation, as is logical, provokes discontent, protests and popular struggles; this reality is justification for confronting the violence of the state and of the dominant classes.
The conjunction of the factors described above shows us a closed democracy, alienated from the needs of majority, that does not allow the participation of its citizens in the solution of the problems which are the result of its own governance. Some political commentators say that the existence of the insurgence does not allow any room for the exercise of democracy or of the left opposition, and with this argument they justify the behaviour of the State. In the concrete conditions of Colombia, faced with the shutting down of democratic solutions, Pedro Vasquez says that "the struggle is more like a key than a padlock". It may not seem useful to insist on following this argument in defence of the validity of revolutionary armed struggle, however, this is the reference point for many diverse theories and theses tending to minimise, question or deny it.

The EPL must not lower its banners

It is necessary to reaffirm the statement of the XIVth Congress: "In the present situation of Colombia it is not enough just to define in principle our adhesion to revolutionary violence and to the establishment of the revolutionary way to the seizure of power." Revolutionary violence is present today in the reality of our country expressing itself in the existence of guerrilla forces, in particular of the Simon Bolivar Co-ordinated Guerrilla Organisation, in the various forms of mass organisations to exercise armed struggle and in the spontaneous uprisings in various sectors and areas of the country.
There exist in the country elements of popular warfare which are deepening at the same time as they are maintaining their objectives of social confrontation.
We believe that conditions do not yet present themselves for insurrection in the short-term or for the total generalisation of popular warfare. Nevertheless, the elements of revolutionary war in existence should be made more powerful by us as part of the revolutionary accumulation of forces towards the seizure of power.
The truth is that there do not exist new factors in the present situation of the country which justify changes contradicting these clear definitions. On the contrary, there has been an accumulation of new facts which support the necessity of insisting on them. For this reason, I consider it right to ratify the position of no renunciation of the ideas which guide us, no laying down of our banners nor going back on the agreements which we have made. Of course, this is an attitude which has practical consequences and is not only an expression of feeling. It means that the Party and the EPL must keep our red revolutionary flags hoisted.
In the present situation the war declared by the State has special significance, because this influences every aspect of the reality of our country. In effect the State has launched a generalised offensive, political and military, against the revolutionary forces, against the democratic forces, and against the leaders of the people and of the social sectors who are protesting and struggling against the injustices of big capital and of the State. As outstanding elements of the development of this total war, it is worth pointing out:
- The intensification of psychological warfare and of black propaganda aimed at de-legitimising the insurgence, for example, by describing them as narco guerrillas, the abandonment of revolutionary ideals, the violation of human rights, the compulsory child labour, etc. In this we must take into account the increased power given to the bourgeoisie through new means of communication.
- The tendency towards a greater militarisation of the life of the country and towards giving more freedom of action to the Armed Forces. As examples we can point out the extreme increase of resources for war and the seeking of more support from the US for the struggle against the insurgents.
-The encouragement of para-militarism which is proposing aims of strengthening itself and expanding to more strategic areas and which is looking for political recognition with the support of political and social groups which will not undermine it.
Within this situation, the EPL has suffered very serious blows whose effects have not been completely understood. It is possible that due to the serious situation confronting the organisation and the attacks by the media, there are appearing cases of demoralisation, uncertainty, lack of enthusiasm, the desire to retire or to give up everything and not to think about the past. In general, we can say that such positions are linked to a narrow and unfocused view of the present situation of the country and of the perspectives of the revolutionary movement. It is feasible that there is ignorance of some situations as they develop or that there are incorrect evaluations of some facts; it is probable that what is being lost is a view of the positive factors which are accumulating and which can lead to changes in the political situation. Because of this it is useful and opportune to gauge correctly, or at least to try to present the development undergone by the insurgency: It is officially recognised -these are not stories of mine- that in the course of the 1990s the number of activists in the CGSB has increased by mush more than 50 per cent; the territorial expansion indicates that in recent years, where there used to be 170 municipalities where the insurgency had a presence, today it is based in 600 municipalities, with significant political influence; it has achieved important military and operational gains; it has also consolidated itself in important social and political sectors, as well as having widened its international relations.
Although, it is true that the EPL has to confront some very serious difficulties, it has contributed to that progress which is due to the uprising of which the EPL forms a part, and it is not isolated from the positive tendencies which are developing, notwithstanding the negative factors which it would be wrong to underestimate. We must bear in mind the situation around us, because the truth is that we are not alone, not in Colombia nor in the world.
What has been said beforehand is bound to the belief that the uprising in Colombia will continue to be a political factor in the transformation of the country's situation. It is completely false to suggest that the uprising has been affected by decadence or that it is falling into decadence or that it lacks revolutionary perspectives.
What is in decadence and lacks perspective is the Colombian state and political regime. If we assume this basic position, it is certain that we can emerge from this serious situation affecting us at present.
The EPL notwithstanding the complex situation that is confronting it has certain possibilities of overcoming negative factors:
- It remains present in the actual situation of the country;
- It can count on members (no matter the number) who are ready to expend every energy in overcoming the obstacles;
- It is taken into account in important political and social sectors;
- It can count on the leadership of the party and on correct policies to guide its revolutionary action.
- It is well positioned, with the orientation of the Party and with the support of other forces, to transform the situation that affects it today.
In the past, faced with situations as serious or even more so than the present, what has allowed us to continue making progress? Without doubt, it has been the qualities which belong to our revolutionary organisation.
- The complete conviction that what we are doing is right;
- Confidence in the success of the cause which inspires our struggle and in the objectives which we put forward;
- Achieving the support of the sectors of the people;
-The readiness of men and women to unite with the struggle and to persist in it;
- The moral principles that we follow;
- The prestige won by our organisation and the recognised authority it has in the political arena.

Fearless in confronting changes

It is evident that significant changes are presenting themselves in the country's situation. How could it not be so? Problems arise when we interpret these changes, because it is here that differences arise. With regard to the transformations and actions related to the uprising, we find people putting forward judgements and prejudices, deductions, speculations and conclusions of the most varied kinds, sometimes with the explicit intention of discrediting the Revolutionary Armed Struggle. For example:
- That the collapse of the USSR caused the decadence of the armed movement in Colombia because it left it without ideological and political foundations. Critics argue that it has lacked consistency since the USSR has not been a theoretical and political support for the Colombia guerrillas.
- That the guerrillas lack political and objective bases which would allow them to put forward serious alternatives. The truth is that the uprising, above all since the 1980s, is that which has offered the most attempts at solutions, up to the point that in many cases they have been adopted by political sectors or even by the state.
- That the CGSB has not explained its political projects nor has it said what it proposes to achieve peace, when in fact the CGSB and every one of its organisations has made every effort to explore ways that might lead to peace with social justice. Since the first years of the government of Belisario Betancur up until the present this has been constant.
- That the armed movement does not have popular support but instead through violence forces people to unite with or support it. On top of this it is said that without the voluntary backing of important popular sectors the armed movement could not exist and even less could it develop.
- That the leaders of the armed movement are "dinosaurs" because they defend an obsolete theory and out of date objectives which do not have any relevance to the present as if any attack could destroy revolutionary theory and the longing to transform a reality which is laden with injustices fought against by revolutionary leaders. The theory which we defend and which we apply is not static but nor is it incorrect.
- That the guerrilla war is the cause of the country's problems and is an obstacle in economic development. What is certain is that the uprising is not a cause but a result of society's grave problems, of unbearable injustice, of social contradictions, of the crisis of the state and of the violence which this exercises against the people.
- That the uprising has become degraded, that it is turned into "narco-guerrilla", into common delinquency and terrorism; that it has left behind it its revolutionary demands and its good intentions, but its main objective is its own enrichment. etc. Even though it is necessary to recognise errors and recognised cases of bad behaviour, everything tells us that this has not changed the revolutionary nature of the uprising, nor has it wiped out its moral principles or the higher level of altruism which is integral to uprising.
-That the guerrilla movement finds itself in a dead end; that there is no way out for it and that for this reason it has to re-incorporate itself in civil life or struggle for its aims through other means permitted by society. The facts show, on the contrary, that the uprising continues to be an irreplaceable factor to achieve profound changes and a point of reference for the transformations which society requires.
- That the guerrillas has achieved advances in military terrain, but not on the political plane. What is complicated is that it is not made clear what is meant by advances on the political plane. One must understand by this that some people would prefer that the uprising should take the social democratic way or the road of demobilisation, already experimented with and with the results that we know.
As we can see, all these criticisms are united in their aim of discrediting the uprising and undermining its validity. Certainly there are differences among those who argue these positions, differences of intention or of class consciousness. In any case it is necessary to deepen our understanding of the real meaning contained in them so that we may give adequate answers.
We must also take note that there are some criticisms motivated by the aim of seeking changes in positions, attitudes or behaviour in the armed organisations: and sometimes it is not easy to establish clearly the differences between the one and the other. From this we see the necessity of making analyses with care, with complete seriousness, without prejudices but without a blank mind...
It is obvious that enormous changes have happened in the world and in Colombia which it would not be correct underestimate, such as the collapse of the USSR, new international relationships, globalisation, the strengthening of the predominance of the US in Latin America, the processes of pacification in Central America, the changes contained in the constitution of 1991, the steps towards demobilisation and towards reintegration, the scandals over corruption, etc.
Also the increase in militarisation, the expansion of para-militarism, the extinction or liquidation of political opposition, the attacks on all social protest, the consequences of the application of neoliberalism. All these factors have had a significant effect on political action and on social relations. And they demand changes in political orientation and action, with the imperative of responding in a revolutionary way. In this we have serious deficiencies, because it can happen that the sequence of developments overcomes the dynamic of theoretical explanations.
From all these situations political consequences are derived. They reawaken questions, they suggest innovations or they demand recognition in political orientation. In the past, we have studied or debated some questions which now acquire greater significance alongside others which are arising in the present: The characteristics of the Marxist-Leninist party, the relationships between the party and the different forms of popular struggle, the situation of the popular movement: that of ebbs and flows (is the movement being set back or is it in the process of recovery?); the validity of the Armed Struggle and the subordination of the armed organisation to the party, the various forms of practice of revolutionary violence, the popular participation in the Armed Struggle, the development of the Armed Struggle and its relationship with other forms of popular struggle; in which sectors should the emphasis put on the building of the FAP? In what areas should guerrilla forces be established? The political direction of actions, the characteristics of the building of a revolutionary army, the unity of the guerrilla forces. And many other innumerable questions to be posed and to be answered.
As has been said earlier, these matters should not be posed as something new since there are already in existence discussions and conclusions which at the very least can serve as reference points. What is correct is to tackle sharply and with seriousness the issues posed as this will permit us to draw out clear lines, as opposed to any improvisations or leaps into the unknown.

The changes must favour revolutionary aims

Without any doubt changes are necessary which depend on the depth of analysis and the interpretation of present reality. Sometimes confusions can present themselves between necessary adjustments and urgent corrections on the one hand, and on the other hand fundamental changes of conception or in the line. This is a question which must have exact answers.
It is not correct nor justifiable to underestimate or to avoid the necessity of elucidating theoretical question which are of great importance for the development of the revolutionary mission of the party and of all its instruments. At this time it is absolutely necessary to clarify and define the most outstanding aspects of our practical work. The need to emphasise practical work stems from the promises we have made to the Colombian people. There are political positions, orientations and decisions which it is necessary to translate into practical work, and it would not be right to invalidate them by subjecting them to more questions, hypotheses or theoretical elaborations at this stage.
In theory and in practice the EPL has a very valuable accumulation which must not be underestimated or even less thrown to one side. Whatever may be the circumstances and the difficulties it can emerge and go forward in the fulfilment of its mission which corresponds with the revolutionary force of the Colombian people.

The EPL is capable of winning

Apart form the reaffirmation that the EPL maintains an unquestionable consistency in the life of the country and occupies its own place there, it is necessary to put forward the following steps with the aim of reinforcing the organisation:
- To reassess our forces seeking primarily to establish our strength in numbers;
- To take forward a careful process of reorganisation;
- To organise the rebuilding of certain structures;
- To plan the work of consolidation by means of political courses and military instruction;
- To concretise the support of other organisations by means of agreements on the basis of common needs;
- Logically the leadership of the party must lead and control this process, delegating particular responsibilities;
- It is necessary to take advantage of all that we have accumulated politically and organisationally; to lean on the prestige and authority gained through struggle; to base ourselves on organised force in order to take new steps forward.
Today's recommendation for practical work is to carry out the tasks well and to do nothing by halves!

Fighting together, we will win!